A Carbon Tax Alone Will Not Solve Climate Change

It’s simplistic and insufficient, and it endangers net-zero emissions.

BY JOHN MILLER | July/August 2024

This article is from Dollars & Sense: Real World Economics, available at http://www.dollarsandsense.org


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The only action needed to solve climate change is a carbon tax. We have an untaxed negative externality, which is effectively a hidden carbon subsidy of enormous size. The solution obviously is to remove the subsidy. We need to have a carbon tax.

We should make it probably a revenue neutral carbon tax. —Elon Musk, “Elon Musk’s Unbelievably Simple Killer Break Down on Climate Change,” X, February 3, 2024.


A carbon tax offers the most cost-effective lever to reduce carbon emissions. A rising carbon tax will replace the need for various carbon regulations that are less efficient.

To maximize the fairness and political viability of a rising carbon tax, all the revenue should be returned directly to U.S. citizens through equal lump-sum rebates.

—“Economists’ Statement on Carbon Dividends,” Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2019.

Most everyone who has taken a course in microeconomics, apparently including Elon Musk, is taught that there is a “simple” solution to a pollution problem: All we have to do is to impose a tax equal to the cost of the damage caused by pollution that goes unaccounted for by market prices. Then market prices will once again create results that are the best of all possible worlds, just as promised in economics textbooks. That’s the message of Elon Musk’s X post from February 2024 that has reached 23 million viewers.

Amateurs like Musk aren’t the only evangelists for market solutions to climate change. In 2019, some 3,649 U.S. economists, including 28 Nobel Laureates, signed the “Economists’ Statement on Carbon Dividends,” published in the Wall Street Journal, that assured us that, “A carbon tax will send a powerful price signal that harnesses the invisible hand of the marketplace to steer economic actors towards a low-carbon future.”

If only it were so. Crafting an effective response to the existential threat of climate change is an enormously complex undertaking. The difference between efficient carbon prices (which correct for the cost of pollution and fuel subsidies) and the actual price of fuel in today’s global economy remains large and pervasive, as an August 2023 report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) emphasized. Beyond that, without environmental regulations, public subsidies, and public investments, a carbon tax is neither a cost-effective nor feasible policy for affecting the massive technological transformation our economy needs to meet the goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. In addition, their estimated price of carbon, when Musk and the authors of the Carbon Dividend statement bother to mention one, is far too small to sufficiently reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Worse yet, neither Musk’s carbon tax nor the economists’ carbon dividend plan would provide the funds needed to make the public investments that are crucial if we are to effectively deal with climate change.

At the risk of being excommunicated from the church of the invisible hand, let’s take a closer look at just why these efforts are bound to fail.

Carbon Prices and the Environment

There are profound differences in how environmentalists and orthodox economists view today’s environmental problems. An environmentalist would demand pollution standards that would protect the health of all citizens, rich and poor, for this generation and future generations, much like other activists demand universal access to basic health care. To orthodox economists, however, any claim about citizens’ rights to breathe clean air makes little sense. As they see it, one can’t just say no to pollution. Pollution, a “bad,” is the inevitable byproduct of the production process that makes the “goods” we want. What’s called for instead is to manage that trade-off.

A Carbon Tax, Gas Prices, and the Elasticity of Demand for Gasoline


It is past time to raise the federal gasoline tax that has been stuck at 18.4 cents a gallon since 1993. But by how much would a carbon tax increase the price of gas? That’s easy enough to compute. (The EPA/Department of Transportation estimates that each gallon of gas emits 8.887 grams of CO2 per gallon, and there are one million grams in a metric ton). Pricing carbon at $43 per metric ton, as the IMF does, would add 38 cents per gallon to the federal gas tax. That would push up the price of gas (which averaged about $3.50 for a gallon of regular in 2023) by 10.9%.

Pricing carbon at $190 per metric ton, as the EPA estimated, would increase the federal gas tax by $1.69. That would raise the average gas price by 48.3%. But the demand for gasoline responds very little to changes in its price, or, as economist would say, the demand for gasoline is inelastic. That’s primarily because consumers have few other ways to get around. In a 2024 study, the U.S. Energy Information Administration used a price of elasticity of 0.3, or that a 1% increase in the price of gas will only reduce gas purchases by 0.3% in the short term. That means pricing carbon at $43 per metric ton would reduce gas purchases by just 3.3%. Pricing carbon at $190 per metric ton would do more, reducing gas purchases by 14.5% or 29.0% (applying the 0.6 estimate of the international price of elasticity in the long term) would reduce gas purchases by 29.0%.

That would still leave us a long way from the low carbon future Elon Musk and the 3,649 economists who signed the statement on carbon dividends promised.

Economists reason that charging a fee for each ton of carbon emitted increases the price of carbon, which will in turn encourage emitters to undertake reductions in pollution that would cost less than the corrected price of carbon. It would also provide an incentive for producers to develop cleaner energy sources and technology. In the language of Economics 101, the government would levy a tax on the “negative externality” that goes unaccounted for in the market price. These corrected market signals would optimize social welfare by guiding output to a level that equates the costs (including climate change) and the benefits of additional output.

That’s not easy to do, anywhere other than on a blackboard. And it was too much for Musk. He never mentions the size of the carbon tax that will solve climate change. For Travis Fisher, a blogger for the libertarian Cato Institute, that’s “a glaring omission.” It surely is, and one that allows Musk to sidestep the complexities of an actual market solution to climate change. (See sidebar, “A Carbon Tax, Gas Prices, and the Elasticity of Demand for Gasoline,” on the next page, for more on the effect of a carbon tax on gas prices, gas purchases, and carbon emissions.)

Sticker Shock

In their August 2023 update, IMF researchers estimated that fossil fuel subsidies across the globe added up to $7 trillion in 2022, or 7.1% of global gross domestic product (GDP). Undercharging for global warming and local air pollution were the chief source of these subsidies. According to the IMF figures, imposing prices that fully accounted for the cost of global carbon dioxide emissions would reduce global emissions in 2030 to well below the level needed to keep global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, raise revenues worth 3.6% of global GDP, and prevent 1.6 million air pollution deaths per year.

But what carbon price, corrected for its damage to the environment and the effects of fuel subsidies, could make this happen? In their 2015 study, the IMF researchers settled on an efficient price for carbon of $43 per metric ton in 2020 and reaching $52 in 2030. These are the prices estimated by the U.S. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon. Ted Halstead, the CEO of the Climate Leadership Council, which organized the “Economists’ Statement on Carbon Dividends,” proposed a similar carbon fee starting at $40 per metric ton and rising each year after that in his May 2019 testimony before Congress.

Mind you, a carbon price of $43 per metric ton is an estimate that is highly sensitive to how it evaluates social costs and future costs. To determine the “optimal” carbon tax requires taking a wide view that calculates a vast array of economic and social costs of climate change, including the value of shortened and lost lives. For instance, the current practice of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is to calculate “the value of a statistical life” as the “aggregate-dollar” amount that a large group would be willing to pay to reduce their individual risk of dying within a year. But their measure varies with the income of the affected group. Surely 100,000 rich people would be willing to pay more to avoid an increased risk to their life than 100,000 poor people. And that difference would be even greater for people in rich countries and people in poor countries.

These estimates also require a long view, which takes into account current costs and those in the future. To do that, economists employ a “discount rate,” similar to the interest rate on a loan, which is meant to reflect the importance society places on the present and the rate of return of possible alternative uses of those funds. The choice of a discount rate is crucial for environmental policy. For instance, the $43-per-metric-ton price of carbon was calculated using a 3% discount rate, which assessed the value of $1,000 of damage from global warming in 2050 as a present value of $437 in 2022. But discounting the value of the environment of future generations is fraught with problems. To begin with, future generations are absent from these decisions about what will become of their environment and if it will remain inhabitable. On top of that, future generations would surely place more value on the future (their presence on Earth), than today (their past). To assign an equal value to the future environment and the present environment would require not discounting costs. That way, $1,000 of environmental damage in 2050 would have had a present value of $1,000 in 2022. And that would make the optimal price of a ton of carbon far higher.

A Progressive Global Green New Deal Proposal


In their 2020 book, Climate Crisis and the Global Green New Deal: The Political Economy of Saving the Planet, Robert Pollin, the co-director of the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), and the renowned left public intellectual Noam Chomsky develop a framework for a global Green New Deal that relies on public and private investment and includes a carbon tax with a rebate but also other funding mechanisms.

The upfront investment costs of their proposal would be substantial: 2.5% of global GDP annually. That would amount to $2.6 trillion in public and private investments in 2024. Over time, those investments are meant to pay for themselves by raising energy efficiency and providing for an abundance of clean renewable energy. Here’s an excerpt of the plan Pollin and Chomsky outline in their book:

Clean Energy Investments: $2.6 trillion

  • $2.1 trillion of public investment and subsidies and private investment would be devoted to developing clean renewable energy (such as wind, geothermal, small-scale hydro, low-emissions bioenergy).
  • $500 billion of investments would go to energy efficiency (for buildings, transportation, industrial equipment, grid and battery storage upgrades).

Public Sources of Funds: $1.3 Trillion

These funds go to finance public investment and subsidies, while the remainder of the clean-energy investment is financed by the private investment supported by those public expenditures. The funding includes a carbon tax with a rebate but also three other large sources of funds:

  • $160 million from carbon tax revenues: Some 25% of the tax revenues goes to finance public green expenditures. The other 75% is returned to consumers in the form of a global $60 per capita rebate.
  • $100 billion from transfers from military budgets: This is equal to 6% of global military spending.
  • $300 billion from green bonds purchases by the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank: This is 1.6% of the Federal Reserve’s Wall Street bailout support during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009.
  • $750 billion from transfers of 25% of fossil fuel subsidies: The $3 trillion of total fossil fuel subsidies would be ended.

A couple of things are certain, however. At $43 per metric ton of carbon, the global price of carbon that accounts for the damage to the environment would be far higher than the current average global carbon price, which reached a peak of $18.97 per ton in 2021, and then plummeted to $4.08 a ton in 2022, as tracked by Kepos Capital’s Carbon Barometer. On top of that, the cost of continuing to make progress toward net-zero carbon emissions after 2030 will push the global price of a ton of carbon higher yet. In its September 2022 report that incorporated “recent scientific advances,” the EPA estimated the social cost of carbon to range from $190 per metric ton in 2020 to $310 in 2050. The Stanford Energy Modeling Forum conducted a study of models of deep decarbonization that allows for economy-wide, net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. They found that, “for the eleven models that provided carbon prices, nine report a price of at least $400/tCO2 [i.e., $400 per metric ton of CO2] in 2050.”

Carbon Prices Are Not Enough

Writing for the Institute for Global Politics, economists Joseph Stiglitz, Scott Barrett, and Noah Kaufman argue that “Carbon prices work best when combined with other policies to support the development of infrastructure, institutions, regulations, and alternative technologies.” IMF director Kristalina Georgieva agrees. For her, that carbon taxes can generate revenues to fund the public investments needed to support the transition to a green economy is one of its chief benefits. The editors of The Economist, the British pro-market weekly, agree as well. In their 2019 brief “on the climate issue,” the editors warn that, “the decarbonization it [a carbon tax] brings will need to be accelerated through well-targeted regulations.” Martin Wolf, the economic commentator for the Financial Times, the British business daily, is also in agreement. In a 2021 article, Wolf told his readers that reaching a net-zero carbon emissions economy “will require huge investment by both public and private sectors, with the latter guided by the right incentives and regulations.”

None of that cuts much ice with Musk or the economists who signed the statement on carbon dividends. Musk’s proposal is revenue neutral. He would cancel out any increase in government revenues from a carbon tax that might have financed green investments by lowering other taxes, such as the value-added tax or the sales tax. The economists’ statement on carbon dividends proposes returning all the revenue from a carbon tax directly to U.S. citizens through equal lump-sum rebates. While those rebates would likely allow the majority of families to benefit financially, they also ensure that carbon tax revenues would not be available to fund green investments. Carbon tax rebates need to be accompanied by other funding to make sure that crucial green public investments get made. (For a proposal that does that, see the sidebar, “A Progressive Global Green New Deal Proposal,” on the next page.)

But shouldn’t using a carbon tax to remove the mammoth fossil fuel subsidy be sufficient to put alternative clean technology on an equally competitive footing with fossil fuel energy sources?

The answer is no. Even prohibitively high carbon prices would not undo the cost advantages afforded to the fossil fuel industry by the public funding of infrastructure, research and development, and tax breaks. Those public expenditures that benefited the fossil fuel industry locked in longstanding advantages and foreclosed more investments in clean energy alternatives. To overcome that “path dependency,” as economists call it, robust public supports are needed to further develop industries in solar, wind, batteries, electric vehicles, and other green technologies. With clean energy alternatives in place (from an extensive network of charging stations for electric cars to mass transit), higher carbon taxes would do much more to reduce the use of gas-fueled vehicles and carbon emissions.

Incremental price changes will not undo the head start that public-sector support afforded fossil fuel technologies. Stiglitz and his co-authors are convinced that, “a lower-cost approach would combine lower carbon prices with measures to tackle these additional barriers.”

A Different Shade of Green

In 1997, on the occasion of his 80th birthday, Barry Commoner, the environmental scientist and 1980 Citizens Party presidential candidate, gave an interview to Scientific American. Commoner argued that:

What is needed now is a transformation of the major systems of production. Restoring environmental quality means substituting solar sources of energy for fossil and nuclear fuels; substituting electric motors for the internal-combustion engine; substituting organic farming for chemical agriculture; expanding the use of durable, renewable and recyclable materials—metals, glass, wood, paper—in place of the petrochemical products that have massively displaced them.

Since Commoner wrote those words, the “fierce urgency of now” has only become more urgent. It is past time for the Green New Deal to be new. A program of massive investments that will create a clean-energy economy supported by a carbon tax and other funding needs to be in place now.

is a professor of economics at Wheaton College and a member of the Dollars & Sense collective.

Elon Musk, “Elon Musk’s Unbelievably Simple Killer Break Down on Climate Change,” X, Feb. 3, 2024 (x.com/farzyness/status/1753828047009034537); Simon Black, Antung A. Liu, Ian Parry, and Nate Vernon, “IMF Fossil Fuel Subsidies Data: 2023 Update,” IMF Working Paper, August 2023 (imf.org); Travis Fisher, “Examining Elon Musk’s Claim That a Carbon Tax Is a Simple Solution to Climate Change,” CATO Institute Blog, Feb. 8, 2024 (cato.org); David Coady, Ian Parry, Louis Sears, and Baoping Shang, “How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies,” IMF Working Paper, May 2015 (imf.org); “Technical Support Document: Technical Update on the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis—Under Executive Order 12866,” Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, United States Government, Nov. 2013 (federalregister.gov); Ted Halstead, “Testimony of Ted Halstead, Chairman and CEO, Climate Leadership Council, “The Economic and Business Case for Bipartisan Climate Policy,” The Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, May 15, 2019 (congress.gov); Joseph Stiglitz, Scott Barrett, and Noah Kaufman, “How Economics Can Tackle the ‘Wicked Problem’ of Climate Change,” Institute of Global Politics, Jan. 19, 2024 (igp.sipa.columbia.edu); “Mortality Risk Evaluation,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, March 11, 2024 (epa.gov); Dylan Matthews, “The tricky business of putting a dollar value on a human life: The EPA’s draft “social cost of carbon” analysis opens up a knotty discussion about US lives versus lives abroad,” Vox, Dec 22, 2022 (vox.com); Peter Coy, “The Price of Carbon Emissions Plunged in 2022, and That’s Not Good,” New York Times, Jan. 12, 2024 (nytimes.com); Morgan Browning et al, “Net-Zero CO2 by 2050 Scenarios for the United States in the Energy Modeling Forum 37 Study,” Energy and Climate Change, Volume 4, December 2023; Fiona Harvey, “Carbon Pricing would raise trillions needed to tackle climate crisis, says IMF,” The Guardian, Dec. 7, 2023 (theguardian.com); “The Climate Issue,” The Economist, Sept. 21, 2019 (economist.com); Martin Wolf, “COP26 is the real thing and not a drill” Financial Times, Oct. 19, 2021 (ft.com); “Report on the Social Cost Greenhouse Gases: Estimates Incorporating Recent Scientific Advances,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Sept. 2022 (epa.gov); Hillard G. Huntington et al., “Review of key international elasticities for major industrializing Countries,” Energy Policy, August 2019 (eia.gov); “STEO Perspectives,” Short Term Energy Outlook, U.S. Energy Information Agency, August 2024 (eia.gov); Alan Hall, “Interview with Barry Commoner,” Scientific American, June 23, 1997.

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